Financial Capital or Social Capital: Evidence From the Survival Analysis of Online P2P Lending Platforms by Lan, Meijing et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
CONF-IRM 2018 Proceedings International Conference on Information ResourcesManagement (CONF-IRM)
5-2018
Financial Capital or Social Capital: Evidence From
the Survival Analysis of Online P2P Lending
Platforms
Meijing Lan
The University of Nottingham Ningbo, meijing.lan@nottingham.edu.cn
Xiuping Hua
The University of Nottingham Ningbo, xiuping.hua@nottingham.edu.cn
Xiaoqua Liu
The University of Nottingham Ningbo, xiaoquan.liu@nottingham.edu.cn
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/confirm2018
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Resources Management (CONF-IRM) at AIS Electronic Library
(AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in CONF-IRM 2018 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For
more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Lan, Meijing; Hua, Xiuping; and Liu, Xiaoqua, "Financial Capital or Social Capital: Evidence From the Survival Analysis of Online
P2P Lending Platforms" (2018). CONF-IRM 2018 Proceedings. 3.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/confirm2018/3
 1 
FINANCIAL CAPITAL OR SOCIAL CAPITAL: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS OF ONLINE P2P LENDING PLATFORMS 
 
Meijing Lan 
The University of Nottingham 
Ningbo, China 














In this paper, we draw upon the bank survival literature and that in the information 
management area in identifying the key factors behind the survival of Chinese online P2P 
lending platforms. In particular, we are interested in determining whether the traditional 
financial capital or the social capital, associated with the online nature of these innovative 
lending platforms, plays a more essential role. We implement a flexible proportional odds 
model with a baseline spline function to analyze survival patterns and also consider potential 
fractional polynomial transformation and time-dependent effect of variables. Using a 
hand-collected dataset of 6190 platforms from June 2007 to June 2017, we provide robust 
evidence that although financial capital variables play an important role in driving platform 
survival, they are less significant or become insignificance in the presence of social capital 
variables. These findings contribute to both the literature and the development of this 
innovative and fast-growing industry of financial inclusion. 
Keywords 
Social Network; Online Reviews; Proportional Odds Model; Cubic Polynomials. 
 
1. Introduction 
During the Great Default between June 2007 to June 2017, 61% (or 3766) of 6190 online 
peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms in China has defaulted. By end of June 2017, half a 
million investors have suffered from defaulted loans with an estimate loss of 4.39 billion 
USD.i The large number of default has triggered public outcries for more financial capital 
requirement including increased registered capital, compulsory insurance plan, setting up 
reserve fund, and so forth, suggested by the main findings in the banking literature, especially 
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the strand on bank survival (Calomiris & Mason, 2003), as the P2P lending platform is 
considered a form of financial intermediary (Datta & Chatterjee, 2008). 
 
Meanwhile, the online nature of P2P platforms indicates such research crosses over to the 
literature of e-commerce and information system, which is one of the contributions this paper 
makes. Electronic financial service agents behave as financial intermediaries by assisting and 
providing sources of trust in online transactions (Datta & Chatterjee, 2008). An important 
concept related to default in the e-commerce and information system field is trustworthiness. 
The lack of trust is shown to be the greatest barrier to online transactions (Kim et al., 2004). 
Companies that successfully build trust are able to better connect with customers and other 
economic players, and achieve better chance for survival (Hoffman et al., 1999; Karimov et 
al., 2011). So what is trust? How can we evaluate it? According to the social capital theory, 
trust is interconnected with social capital: social capital is not only a generator of trust 
(Putnam et al., 1994), but also a motivational result of trust (Adler & Kwon, 2002). An 
organization with higher level of social capital is able to generate higher level of trust, which 
in turn accumulate more social capital (Lins et al., 2017). The same theory carries over to the 
online P2P lending industry. 
 
Given the different theories and focuses on survival in the banking literature versus the 
e-commerce literature, we raise two research questions: First, for the online P2P lending 
industry, are financial capital and social capital both significant factors for survival? If they 
are, is one type of capital more essential than the other? Answers to these questions are 
relevant to investors, regulators, and platform managers, and substantively advance our 
understanding of this new form of financial innovation. For P2P investors, a healthy and 
viable P2P lending industry helps mitigate or avoid financial losses. For regulators, the ability 
to identify major risk factors allows them to put forth more relevant and effective policy and 
reduce specific or regional financial risk. For online P2P platform managers, our findings will 
enable them to learn from the history and improve their chance for survival. 
 
As far as we are aware, our study is the first that examines P2P lending platform default in 
the wider crowdfunding industry. Hence we fill a gap in the crowdfunding literature that so 
far focuses mainly on the market economic mechanism or behaviour of market participants 
(e.g., Mollick, 2014; Zhang & Liu, 2012). Methodologically, we extend the economics and 
e-commerce literature which predominantly adopts the Cox (1972) model (e.g., Wang et al., 
2013; Wheelock & Wilson, 2000) by constructing a flexible proportional odds model with a 
baseline spline function. The model is able to not only identify influential variables to a 
platform’s survival but also predict with accuracy future survival pattern. Fractional 
polynomial transformation is also considered to uncover potential nonlinearity in variables. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our econometric model. 





2. Econometric framework 
2.1. Parametric model construction 
Originated from biostatistics, survival analysis is applied widely to analyze firm survival. 
Following Royston and Parmar (2002), we use a flexible parametric survival model with 
cubic splines, to address the disadvantages of the popular Cox (1972) model, which is 
criticized for constant hazard ratio and not being able to predict survival time, hazard rates, or 
absolute risk (Orth, 2013). Furthermore, we choose the flexible proportional odds (PO) model 
since it generalizes the baseline survival function to avoid poor fit and over fit, respectively, 
of standard parametric models and the Cox models (Gelfand et al., 2000). Also, it assumes 
that hazard ratios converge to one if  (Bennett, 1983), which is consistent with our 
dataset. In our application, the log odds that failure events will occur in the interval  
can be written as follows: 
 
 
where  stands for the covariate matrix and Fin, Soc, and Control are covariate matrices for 
financial capital, social capital and control variables respectively. Define the baseline 
distribution function , we have the PO model as follows: 
  
 




Following Bouvatier and Delatte (2015) and Royston and Parmar (2002), the baseline 
function is a restricted cubic spline function, which exhibits less restrictions on the functional 
form and mitigates misspecification problem (see Harrell (2001)). A restricted cubic splines 
function is a smoothed piecewise cubic polynomials function restricted to be linear beyond 
the two boundary knots, kmin and kmax, the minimum and maximum of uncensored survival 
times of platforms. The restricted cubic spline function  with m interior knots, 
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kmin<k1<…<km< kmax, and two boundary knots, kmin and kmax, can be written as 
  of which,  
, and  for 
for j=1,…,m. And the “+” function is defined as 
 
 , and .  
 
The baseline spline function parameters are orthogonalized to be uncorrelated with each other, 
have mean zero and unit standard deviation to improve their numerical stability. For the 
flexible PO(d) model, d is the degree of freedom (d.f.) corresponding to d-1 interior knots. 
The number of knots can be determined via the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or the 
Bayes information criterion (BIC) to avoid underfitting or overfitting and the interior knots 
are evenly placed at every 100/d percentiles as suggested by Royston and Parmar (2002).  
 
In the defaults strand of the literature, time-dependent effect of covariates are usually 
considered (Gupta et al., 2017). The time-dependent effect is captured by the interaction 
between the covariate and the spline variables as follows: 
  
 
where D is the number of time-dependent effect variables,  is the parameter estimates of 
the spline function of time-dependent effect variable,  is the time-dependent effect 
variable. We constrain knots number and placements to those of the baseline spline function.  
 
2.2. Nonlinear transformation of variables 
There is widespread interest in considering potential nonlinearity transformation of variables 
in the literature (Nikolaeva et al., 2015), since nonlinearity can more precisely model the 
variables and better discover the phenomena/theory (Nikolaeva et al., 2015). But rather than 
use logarithmic or quadratic functions with predefined shapes, we use fractional polynomial 
(FP) function with flexible shapes following Royston and Sauerbrei (2008) and Sauerbrei and 
Royston (1999). In specific, for a given variable x, the nonlinear relationship can be modeled 




The set of powers  is  and  is the natural logarithm. 
For a 2 degree FP where , . In our PO model we use the 
FP with one power term, FP(1). The decision of FP transformation depends on whether it 
decreases the deviance (minus two maximized log likelihood), and the degree of power term 
is determined by the best-fitting  that generates the minimum deviance.  
 
2.3. Model estimation 
The PO(d) model is estimated via the full maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood function 
for platform i is denoted as , and the likelihood for the whole sample is . Let 
, then its first derivative is . The 




And our econometric analysis is conducted via the following steps: First, choose the d.f. for 
the PO model via the AIC and/or BIC values to identify the most appropriate proportionality 
parameterization. Second, perform a backward elimination process and remove the least 
significant variables. Third, apply a backward selection process to identify nonlinear 
variables and choose the best fit FP transformation using closed-test algorithm. Fourth, 
extend the model by including possible time-dependent effect. A forward selection process is 
implemented using the 1% significance level. Fifth, plot the smoothed martingale residuals to 
assess the goodness of fit. Finally, investigate covariate effects graphically. 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Data source 
The social capital data are hand collected from the two most vibrant third-party professional 
sites, WDZJ (www.wdzj.com) and P2Peye (www.p2peye.com), which serve investors and 
platforms by providing free service such as investor community discussion forum, platform 
data disclosure, platform directory, and industry statistics. Based on Alexa website traffic 
ranking in China, these two websites are the top two most visited directory websites in online 
P2P lending industry. The financial capital data come from three sources. WDZJ and P2Peye 
disclose risk transfer and mitigation data based on information extracted from platforms’ 
official websites. Company registry information are collected from the government official 
database, National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System (www.gsxt.gov.cn). 
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Prefecture-level economic capital data are from the database of National Bureau of Statistics 
of China (http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/), and from city statistics bureau respectively. The 
final data source is the official websites for platforms for supplement or for cross check. 
 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Platform survival 
Our study examines P2P platforms founded between June 2007, when the first P2P online 
lending platform was established, and June 2017. Survival is defined if a P2P lending 
platform’s website is still accessible, its contact numbers can be reached and its business is 
normally and independently operating. Our definition for survival is consistent with the 
literature on firm survival (Lyles et al., 2004); and the event indicator is 0 for these survived 
platforms, and 1 for failed platforms. For platforms that are ongoing by the end of our sample 
period, its lifespan is denoted as the difference between end of June 2017 and its entry date, 
but the event indicator will be 0, so right censoring will occur in this case, but PO model can 
deal with the issue. Besides, on condition that a platform was merged or acquired by another 
company, depending on whether the new entity is still running in online P2P lending industry, 
we categorize it differently: event indicator is 1 if the new entity is still running business in 
online P2P lending industry, and 0 if the platform changes to another industry. 
 
3.2.2. Social capital variables 
To operationalize the concept of social capital, we propose two measures based on the 
seminar work of Adler and Kwon (2002): online social network and online social reviews. 
The online social network is essential for a platform to establish and generate social relations, 
whereas online social reviews help strengthen the social relations (Gunilla & Mariam, 2004; 
Wang et al., 2013). Online social network is measured as friends number (Wang et al., 2013; 
Yang & Li, 2016) and online information sharing activity (Gunilla & Mariam, 2004). We use 
subscriber number (Subscribers) as a proxy for friends number. Posts number (Posts) is used 
to measure online information sharing activity. Both variables are scaled by platform age 
considered that older platforms tend to have more subscribers other things being equal.  
 
Online social reviews can be measured as detailed service quality ratings and online reviews 
(Wang et al., 2013). Investors are able to share their investment experience by leaving 
detailed service quality ratings (DSQR), which are categorized into four aspects of platform 
service: cash withdrawal time, capital utility rate, customer service, and user experience. 
Each category is graded from 1 to 5 with the highest score being the best. We use the average 
of the four ratings (mDSQR) to capture this variable following Wang et al. (2013). The 
variance of DSQR (vDSQR) is used for robustness checks. Investors are also able to put down 
reviews for a particular platform and also attribute the reviews to one of three categories: 
“Poor; do not recommend”, “Neutral”, and “Excellent; recommend”. Thus we derive the ratio 
of negative/neutral/positive ratings by taking the percentage of negative/neutral/positive 
ratings over the total number of ratings. We only include negative ratings (Neg_rating) for 
two reasons. First, the literature has shown that good news is expected and neutral news is not 
influential (Fiske, 1980). The other reason is to avoid potential multicollinearity. When using 
percentage negative ratings, a zero percent can indicate either the platform is very good and 
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do not receive negative ratings, or no investors has rated the platform. To differentiate 
between these two scenarios, we add a dummy variable (No_rating). 
 
3.2.3. Financial capital variables 
Financial capital is the financial resources available to a company. In the online P2P lending 
platform context, we identify financial capital as the capital providing safety net, risk transfer, 
risk mitigation and the prefecture-level economic support to a platform following the bank 
failure literature (Betz et al., 2014; Calomiris & Mason, 2003). The registered capital 
(Capital) is expected to serve as safety net and cover various costs since platforms usually 
have heavy operational costs (Cubillas et al., 2017). For risk transfer, platforms usually seek 
external guarantee such as insurance companies for sustainability improvement. We use a 
dummy variable (Out_guaran) to indicate if a platform has outside guarantees and a variable 
(Out_guaran_amt) to show log external guarantee amount. Another dummy (Loan_nego) for 
risk transfer is to see whether a secondary market allowing investors to negotiate loans is 
built. Risk mitigation measures can help relieve a platform’s financial distress. Two common 
measures platforms take are to require borrower collateral against their borrowing 
(Brrw_cllatrl) or to set up risk fund reserve (Riskfund). Platforms also try to mitigate investor 
risk exposure by committing to pay back investors principal (Prin_guaran) or advancing 
capital to investors if a loan turns bad (Advance). The GDP per capita (GDP_capita) is used 
as a proxy for prefecture-level economic capital because people live in more well-off cities 
are more likely to invest more and more tolerant to losses. Although P2P lending platforms 
operate online, they are governed and supported by local regulatory authority. 
 
3.2.4. Control variables 
A number of control variables are included to avoid potential variable omission problem, 
including dummies to indicate whether platforms provide hotline (Hotline), interactive 
system (App) or transaction system (Autobid), and variables to illustrate self-disclosure level 
(News) and firm size (Employees). 
 
3.3. Descriptive analysis 
Figure 1 shows platforms lifespan distribution in our sample. It is apparent that the industry is 
dominated by young companies. Only around 2% of platforms last more than five years, and 
only 0.2% of platforms survive more than eight years. Descriptive and correlation statistics 
are available upon request. Most social capital and financial capital variables are 
right-skewed, indicating that many platforms are underperformers in the industry, with some 
very strong performers on the other end of the distribution. Correlation in most cases is 
between -0.50 and 0.50 and not cause for collinearity concern. 
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Figure 1: Histogram of platform distribution 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Estimation results 
Our baseline results are reported in Table 1 using the PO(3) model without considering 
nonlinear transformation of variables or time-dependent effect. We prefer the PO(3) model 
which combines low AIC/BIC value with model parsimony, and the problem of underfitting 
or overfitting is avoided. Three main results are apparent. First, positive social relations 
between platforms and their customers decreases the default probability and increases the 
lifespan. Second, Model (2) shows that platforms benefit generally from their financial safety 
net, risk transfer and mitigation measures, and prefecture-level economic development, but 
the money back policy (Prin_guaran) puts platforms at a higher risk of failure. Third, when 
both social and financial capital variables are included in Model (3), the significance of all 
but two coefficients for financial capital variables are reduced and some of them become 
insignificant; while the sign and significance of social capital variables remain.  
 
Interestingly, the number of posts is positively related to a platform’s failure, which seems 
counter-intuitive since more posts is usually interpreted as more social visibility and relations 
(Wang et al., 2013). We run a text description analysis and extract the 30 most frequently 
used words in online posts for platforms less than 2 years old, the sample mean lifespan, for 
failed and surviving platforms separately. Results show that for the failed platforms the most 
often used words are negative including fraud, rights problem and so forth whereas the 
corresponding words for surviving platforms are more positive such as return, experience, 
and security. Furthermore, more posts are published for failed platforms than surviving ones. 
We believe that in this context the saying no news is good news is evidenced 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient z-statistics Coefficient z-statistics Coefficient z-statistics 
Subscribers -1.568*** (-25.50)   -1.207*** (-17.60) 
Posts 1.731*** (26.80)   1.813*** (26.25) 
mDSQR -0.014 (-0.59)   -0.057** (-2.27) 
Neg_rating 1.064*** (10.26)   0.884*** (8.08) 
No_rating 1.121*** (14.12)   0.917*** (10.78) 
Capital   -0.086*** (-5.87) 0.0142 (0.82) 
Loan_nego   -1.111*** (-18.23) -0.357*** (-4.91) 
Out_guaran   -0.503*** (-9.28) -0.061 (-0.98) 
Out_guaran_amt   -0.037*** (-4.94) -0.016** (-2.15) 
Brrw_cllatrl   -0.935*** (-6.14) 0.295* (1.74) 
Riskfund   -0.526*** (-8.87) -0.041 (-0.63) 
Prin_guaran   0.450*** (7.30) 0.811*** (10.83) 
Advance   -0.022 (-0.36) 0.097 (1.46) 
GDP_capita   -0.508*** (-8.87) -0.238*** (-4.04) 
Basis0 1.748*** (72.08) 1.355*** (71.67) 1.812*** (70.09) 
Basis1 -0.286*** (-18.55) -0.209*** (-15.66) -0.303*** (-18.66) 
Basis2 -0.067*** (-4.70) -0.086*** (-7.40) -0.063*** (-4.15) 
Controls NO  NO  YES  
Constant -1.278*** (-17.31) 7.115*** (10.52) 2.356*** (3.30) 
N 6190  5859  5842  
LogL -6658  -7551  -6029  
RD
2
 0.518  0.147  0.559  
C 0.782  0.653  0.796  








The long list of significant coefficients in the baseline results makes it difficult for investors, 
policymakers and platform managers to clearly see the message. Hence we follow the model 
estimation procedure outlined in Section 2.3 and undertake a prognostic test. Results are 
summarized in Table 2. In Table 3, we include all significant variables from the prognostic 
test. The results are consistent with our baseline models, further substantiating the stability 
and robustness of our model. Model (5) is our ultimate model for P2P lending platform 
survival. In addition, the smoothed martingale residuals of coefficient estimation see no 
systematic departure from zero, indicating a good fit for Model (5). 
Variables 










 Powers or 
exclusion 
 Include or 
not 
d.f. 
Subscribers 548.723*** 0  1  no — 
Posts 1502.350*** 272.745***  0.5  no — 
mDSQR 7.579* 0.478  1  no — 
Neg_rating 57.347*** 5.446**  2  no — 
No_rating 131.183*** 0  1  include 2 
Capital 5.364 —  exclude  no — 
Loan_nego 20.651*** 0  1  no — 
Out_guaran 1.531 —  exclude  no — 
Out_guaran_amt 4.682 —  exclude  no — 
Brrw_cllatrl 4.846 —  exclude  no — 
Riskfund 0.042 —  exclude  no — 
Prin_guaran 99.616*** 0  1  include 3 
Advance 0.948 —  exclude  no — 
GDP_capita 12.378*** 0  1  no — 
Hotline 32.197*** 0  1  no — 
App 36.945*** 0  1  no — 
Autobid 0.142 —  exclude  no — 
News 81.899*** 28.321***  -2  no — 





Table 2. Selection of influential variables, nonlinear transformation and time-dependent effect 
 FP Transformation 
(4) (5) 
Coefficient z-statistics Coefficient z-statistics 
Subscribers — -1.246*** (-19.99) -1.282*** (-19.29) 
Posts* (Posts)
0.5
 2.925*** (32.12) 2.852*** (31.71) 
mDSQR — -0.069*** (-2.74) -0.082*** (-3.07) 
Neg_rating* (Neg_rating)2 0.875*** (7.87) 1.032*** (8.65) 
No_rating — 0.958*** (11.52) 1.029*** (11.52) 
Loan_nego — -0.330*** (-4.57) -0.324*** (-4.22) 
Prin_guaran — 0.748*** (10.93) 0.614*** (7.59) 
GDP_capita — -0.225*** (-3.88) -0.218*** (-3.76) 
Hotline — -0.368*** (-4.9) -0.323*** (-4.55) 
App — -1.342*** (-5.08) -1.317*** (-4.99) 
News* (News)
-2 5.56e-09*** (9.22) 5.52e-09*** (8.95) 
Employees* (Employees)
-1
 0.055*** (8.02) 0.043*** (6.32) 
Basis0 — 1.856*** (72.12) 2.124*** (26.12) 
Basis1 — -0.327*** (-20.79) -0.124* (-1.86) 
Basis2 — -0.051*** (-3.35) -0.088*** (-5.23) 
Basis_No_rating0 —   -0.337*** (-3.91) 
Basis_No_rating1 —   -0.144** (-2.01) 
Basis_Prin_guaran0 —   0.618*** (6.19) 
Basis_Prin_guaran1 —   -0.113 (-1.46) 
Basis_Prin_guaran2 —   0.240*** (4.99) 
Basis_Employees0 —   -0.014*** (-2.79) 
Constant — 0.170 (0.25) 0.003 (0.00) 
N  5859  5859  
LogL  -5897  -5813  
RD
2
  0.586  0.636  
C  0.801  0.806  




Table 3. Prognostic model with nonlinearity transformation and time-dependent effect 
 
To summarize, the consistency in coefficient estimates across Model (1) to Model (5) 
reinforces our key message on P2P lending platform survival: these online platforms still rely 
on financial resources for their survival in a way similar to more traditional financial service 
entities. However, operational entirely online has added an additional dimension to their core 
characteristics thus making social capital a more essential driver for survival. In the online 
context, when social capital is absent, financial capital offers valuable indication of platform 
operation. However, when social capital is available, it provides more dynamic and detailed 
information on customer population, ratings and feedback, hence proves more influential to 
the decision-making of customers, leading to its more significant impact on platform survival. 
These results enrich and advance our understanding of the determinants for the survival of 
Chinese online P2P lending platforms. 
 
4.2. Graphical analysis 
Figure 2 illustrates the time-varying effect of a variable exerts on the hazard rate. The hazard 
ratio is between the hazard rate of a variable plus one standard deviation and the hazard rate 
of the variable itself. For dummy variables, the ratio is between the hazard rate of 1 and that 
of zero. For social capital variables, subscriber number has a long run effect, whereas others 
have comparatively short-term effect. For example, the effect of posts number is quite large at 
=0 but drops swiftly and massively within two years. For financial capital variables, 
prefecture-level economic capital exhibits a long-term effect whereas the other two exhibit 
shorter-term effect. Money back policy (Prin_guaran) improves survivability at a very early 
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stage to around four months as it mitigates the platform’s liability of newness (Freeman et al., 
1983). However, the benefit gradually diminishes for the first few years of operation, but if 
the platform can survive long enough, this negative effect subsequently fades away. 
 
Figure 2. Effect of financial and social capital varaibles on hazard ratio, with 95% CI band 
 
The economic intuition of social and financial capital variables indicates that in order to 
enhance platform survival probability more efficiently, a platform can either increase its 
social capital by obtaining more subscribers, having less negative posts, and soliciting better 
investor rating, or increase its financial capacity by opening a secondary market, growing 
independent from money back policy, and locating in economically better off cities. 
 
4.3. Prediction analysis 
The prognostic index ( ) estimated via our model can illustrate the level of a platform’s 
default risk and help predict its survival. Figure 3 plots platform survival time against the 
prognostic index, with the 10th and the 90th percentile representing low and high default risk, 
respectively. For firms with medium-level risk, the survival time for bottom and top 10th 
suggests that 80% platforms with medium risk operate between 9 to 67 months before they 
default. Information of this nature is very useful, especially to investors for making informed 
investment decision, and to regulators for introducing relevant and directed policy. 
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Figure 3. Survival time in 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles 
 
4.4. Robustness check 
To show that our results are not due to specific choice for variables or estimation method, we 
conduct four robustness tests, including dividing the outsider guarantee variable (Out-guaran) 
into four specific common types, using the variance of DSQR rather than the mean, applying 
an extended Cox model (Cox, 1972), and using variables without FP transformation; we find 
qualitatively similar results. Results are available upon request. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We assess the role of social capital variables and financial capital variables in determining 
survival patterns of online P2P lending platforms via implementing a flexible proportional 
odds model with a baseline spline function as well as considering potential nonlinearity and 
time-dependent effect of variables. Our prognostic model captures 12 influential variables out 
of 19 available variables, and it shows nice fit and robust prediction power. The model is 
simple but powerful in providing reference to investors and policy makers in monitoring 
platforms. It is flexible enough to accommodate new variable and data at higher frequency. 
 
We also uncover a host of important findings. First, social capital is a key driver to platform 
survival and is more significant than financial capital in economic terms. For investors and 
policy makers, social capital is helpful for distinguishing high and low risk lending platforms. 
Financial capital is important to platforms but registered capital can be misleading to 
investors as it is not a significant indicator for platform survival. For platform managers, not 
all social capital deserves their effort in the long run. We find that increasing subscriber 
number and achieving better customer ratings are the key to survive longer. In addition, 
opportunities of information exchange between platform and customers and between 
customers themselves enhance survival probability. We also argue that gathering a large 
number of posts at an early stage is not a good sign for survival as investors are more likely 
to punish those platforms by posting negative comments and sharing poor experience.  
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